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 Abstract 
 In his paper, “! e Paradox of Forgiveness” (this  Journal 6 (2009), p. 365-393), Leo Zaibert 
defends the novel and interesting claim that to forgive is deliberately to refuse to punish. I argue 
that this is mistaken. 
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 In his paper, “! e Paradox of Forgiveness,” Leo Zaibert defends the novel and 
interesting claim that to forgive is deliberately to refuse to punish. 1 I argue that 
this is mistaken. 
 1.  Zaibert on Forgiveness 
 Sometimes we forgive others for their actions (or omissions, or consequences 
of their actions or omissions). 2 ! e most commonly held account of forgive-
ness claims that, roughly, to forgive someone for her past wrongful harm 
against you is to overcome the resentment you experience towards her because 
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of what she did. 3 Call this the Resentment View. ! ere have been many diff er-
ent incarnations of this view throughout the literature, but we need not 
rehearse the details. 4 Other accounts of forgiveness have been off ered, but 
none has gained as much attention as the Resentment View. 5 Standard 
accounts of forgiveness therefore see forgiveness primarily as involving the 
forswearing or overcoming of  resentment , and this is why Zaibert’s account is 
novel, for he argues that forgiveness involves the forswearing of  punishment . 
 Zaibert’s account of forgiveness is highly nuanced so we shall need to do 
some background work fi rst. We can begin with Zaibert’s account of blame. 
He writes:
 A blames B for Xing, when:
 (1)  A believes that X is wrong, 
 (2)  A believes that X is an action of B, 
 (3)  A believes that B is a moral agent, 
 (4)  A believes that there are no excuses, justifi cations or other circumstances 
which would preclude blame, 
 (5)  A believes that the world would have been a better place had B not done X. 
 (6)  A believes that the world would be a better place if something would happen 
to B, something which would somehow off set B’s Xing. 
 (7)  B’s having Xed tends to make A  feel something negative, i.e., a reactive 
emotion, like outrage, indignation or resentment. 6 
 3 It is a testament to this view’s popularity among philosophers that John Kekes (‘Blame ver-
sus Forgiveness,’  ! e Monist 92 (2009), p. 490) and Leo Zaibert (‘! e Paradox of Forgiveness’, 
p. 388) both have recently labeled it the “standard view.” Defenders of the view are legion and 
include Jeff rie Murphy,  Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), Charles Griswold,  Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), and Stephen Darwall,  ! e Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, 
and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
 4 For example, there is disagreement about what resentment is. Some think of it as a “hostile 
feeling” which aims at infl icting harm on the off ender (e.g. Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, 
‘In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness,’  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2002-
2003), pp. 39-60), while others think of it as a feeling of “moral protest” (e.g. Pamela Hieronymi, 
‘Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,’  Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 
LXII (2001), pp. 529-555), while some others think of resentment as a kind of “moral anger” 
(e.g. Paul Hughes, ‘What is Involved in Forgiving?’  Philosophia 25 (1997), pp. 33-49). Some 
have understood the view to mean that resentment must be permanently eliminated (e.g. Joram 
Haber,  Forgiveness: A Study (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 1991), p. 7), while others argue 
that resentment must only be moderated (e.g. Margaret Holmgren, ‘Forgiveness and the Intrinsic 
Value of Persons’,  American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1994), pp. 341-2). 
 5 For example, on Richard Swinburne’s “Moral Debt View” of forgiveness, to forgive is to 
cancel the “moral debt” that one has against an off ender because of what she did. See his 
 Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). On Joram Haber’s 
“Linguistic View,” forgiveness is paradigmatically a performative utterance. See his  Forgiveness: A 
Study, 1991. 
 6 Zaibert, ‘! e Paradox of Forgiveness’, p. 387. 
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 Blame, in all of its incarnations, is therefore a  private aff air, for it consists solely 
in a syndrome of beliefs, as well as a disposition to experience certain emotions 
(even if the disposition is not made manifest). 7 Furthermore, to act on one’s 
blame of a wrongdoer is to  punish her . One punishes, according to Zaibert, 
when one meets conditions (1-7), in addition to: 
 (8’)  A does something to B which A believes it is painful for B to endure, as a 
response to B’s having Xed. 8 
 Punishment is, as it were, blame carried out or acted upon. “To punish,” he 
says, “is to do something about what we fi nd blameworthy.” 9 In other words, 
the pain caused by punishing must be done on the  basis that it would some-
how off set the original wrongdoing, per condition (6). One punishes with the 
goal of making the world a better place by causing pain to the wrongdoer. ! e 
pain accrued to the wrongdoer “off sets” the pain caused by the original wrong-
doing. To summarize: blame is private, and punishment is blame’s overt 
manifestation. 
 Punishment is one way for blame to “extend” into other moral phenomena. 
But another way blame can be extended is by way of forgiveness, of which 
Zaibert distinguishes two kinds or senses. According to the fi rst sense of for-
giveness (what Zaibert calls “pure forgiveness”), A forgives B in the sense of 
being a “pure mental phenomenon” 10 when A blames B (i.e. conditions (1-7) 
hold)  and : 
 (8)  A believes that the world would in fact be a worse place if  she [i.e. A] did 
something to B in response to her wrongdoing, and thus she deliberately 
refuses to try to off set B’s wrongdoing. 11 
 We forgive in this “pure” sense when we blame an agent and also believe that 
 our punishing her would not off set her wrongful harm, and therefore,  for that 
reason , we refuse to punish her. In other words, the forgiver believes that the 
 7 One might balk at my suggestion that Zaibert is here claiming that all blame is private in 
light of the fact that he introduces his conditions for blame with the phrase, “A blames B for 
Xing when […],” which suggests that he is only giving a set of suffi  cient conditions for blame. 
However, he explicitly states, prior to giving his conditions for blame, punishment, and forgive-
ness that “[t]he analyses of each of these phenomena should make these diff erences [between 
them] explicit” (Zaibert, ‘! e Paradox of Forgiveness’, p. 387). ! is suggests that he is intending 
to give a set of necessary  and suffi  cient conditions. Hence my suggestion that Zaibert is claiming 
that all blame is private. 
 8 Ibid., p. 387. 
 9 Ibid., p. 385. 
 10 Ibid., p. 387. 
 11 Ibid. 
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wrongdoer should still be punished because such punishment would make 
the world a better place, and yet the forgiver also holds the belief (true or not) 
that were  she to punish,  her punishing the wrongdoer would make the world 
a  worse place. When she forgives she therefore refrains from punishing  for 
that reason. 
 Not all forgiveness is solely “pure,” for sometimes pure forgiveness is com-
municated. When one forgives in this other, “communicative sense” of for-
giveness, conditions (1-8) are met, in addition to:
 (9)  A communicates to B, or to someone else, that she has forgiven (in the sense 
of a pure mental phenomenon) B. 12 
 Zaibert then claims that blame can be extended either in the direction of 
punishment (in which case, condition (8’) is met in conjunction with (1-7)), 
 or in the direction of forgiveness (in which case either condition(s) (8) or (8-9) 
is/are met in conjunction with (1-7)), but that blame  cannot be extended (on 
pain of irrationality) in both directions  at the same time . 13 ! at is, at any given 
time, the conjunction of (8) and (8’) is not satisfi able. If one punishes, one 
does not forgive, and if one forgives, one does not punish. 
 We can therefore gloss Zaibert’s accounts of the two kinds or senses of 
forgiveness as follows: 
 (PF)   A  purely forgives B when A blames B, A believes that A’s punishing 
B would make the world a worse place, and A deliberately refuses to 
punish B on that basis. 
 (CF)  A  communicatively forgives B when A communicates to B that A has 
purely forgiven B. 
 2.  Blame, Punishment and Forgiveness 
 ! ere are at least three problems with Zaibert’s claims about blame, punish-
ment, and forgiveness. First, consider the following pair of claims: that blame 
is exclusively private, and that when blame is acted upon, this amounts to 
punishment. Both of these claims are mistaken. First, as many writers on 
blame have argued, blame may be both privately and overtly manifested. 14 
 12 Ibid. 
 13 Ibid. 
 14 See, for example: Michael McKenna,  Conversation and Responsibility (forthcoming with 
Oxford University Press), Ishtiyaque Haji , Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities 
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Private blame involves the manifestation of a disposition to regard the wrong-
doer in a certain way. According to a very popular view, the relevant kind of 
regard involves the manifestation of one of the so-called “reactive attitudes,” 
for example, resentment, indignation, or disapprobation. 15 
 Sometimes, however, we may not only manifest a disposition to regard the 
wrongdoer in a certain way, we may also manifest a disposition to treat (or 
respond to) her in a certain way. When these dispositions are made manifest 
in certain ways, one engages in overt blame. Overt blame is therefore blame’s 
outward manifestation. Examples of overt blaming behavior include reproach, 
censure, shunning, outright denunciation, the suspension of friendly rela-
tions, and other expressions of anger, hostility, or disapproval, such as a disap-
proving facial grimace or a gentle reprimand. Because we can blame both 
privately and overtly, Zaibert is therefore mistaken to think that all blame 
is private. 16 
 Naturally, Zaibert might object that this is simply a verbal quibble. He 
might reply that what I am calling overt blame he is calling punishment and 
that we are simply arguing over who gets to use what words. But this is not 
simply a verbal quibble, for overt blame and punishment are importantly dif-
ferent: whereas punishment essentially involves the intention to cause pain, 
overt blame does not. Recall that Zaibert’s view of punishment is retributivist; 
when we infl ict pain on a wrongdoer as a response to the wrongdoing she has 
done, we do so with the express purpose of “off setting” that wrong. All things 
being equal, according to a retributivist picture, the world is a better place 
when wrongs are off set in this way. ! e goal of punishment is therefore to 
infl ict pain upon the wrongdoer, and when we punish we do so  in order to 
off set the wrongful harm that was done. When one punishes one  plans to 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), R. Jay Wallace,  Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), and Michael J. Zimmerman, 
 An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 1988). 
 15 See, for example: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza,  Responsibility and Control: 
A ! eory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Paul Russell, 
 Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), John Martin Fischer,  Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), Wallace,  Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (1994), and P.F. 
Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment,’  Proceedings of the British Academy Vol. 48, (1962). 
 16 Zaibert might reply that there is no such thing as overt blame, just blame  expressed . Even 
supposing we grant this, I will argue: (1) we can  express blame in a way that is not equivalent to 
punishment; and (2) we can express blame in a way incompatible with forgiveness. So whether 
we call it “overt blame” or “blame expressed,” this makes little diff erence for my purposes here. 
My thanks to Eve Garrard for drawing this point to my attention. 
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infl ict pain. In other words: when one punishes one  intends to infl ict pain. 
! at is the point of retributive punishment. 17 
 But overt blame does  not necessarily involve an intention to infl ict pain. 
Suppose I tell a mildly embarrassing joke about you at dinner. Were you to 
give me a disapproving grimace from across the table, or later on gently repri-
mand me for treating you in that way, you need not do so with the intention 
of causing me pain. Your intention may simply be to communicate to me, 
through some way or another, that I have not treated you with due regard. But 
to do  that is not to punish me, for punishment involves, as we have seen, the 
intention to cause pain. Now it may very well be true that your disapproving 
grimace or gentle reprimand does in fact cause me pain in some way. It may 
very well also be true that you  knowingly and  intentionally cause me pain by 
gently reprimanding me. But to do something knowingly and intentionally is 
 not the same as intending to do it. 18 You may knowingly and intentionally 
cause me pain by blaming me, and yet view the pain that you cause me as a 
“regrettable derivative,” a foreseen yet undesired byproduct of your plan, 
which, let us say, is to express your disapproval of how I have treated you. And 
yet because punishment requires an intention to cause pain, punishing and 
overtly blaming come apart, both conceptually and in practice. 19 We should 
therefore conclude that Zaibert is mistaken on two counts: that all blame is 
private, and that all blame that is overtly expressed amounts to punishment. 
 17 Cf. Joel Feinberg,  Doing & Deserving: Essays in the ! eory of Responsibility (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1970): “It is an essential and intended element of punishment […] 
that the victim be made to suff er and of liability that he be made to pay; these are not mere 
regrettable derivatives of the undertakings, but rather their  termini ad quem. ” 
 18 For example, suppose I decide to pick up a book at the library this afternoon. I therefore 
form the intention to pick up a book at the library. ! at is my plan, what I  intend to do. Suppose 
I did what I intended to do: I picked up the book. In picking up the book, I walked along a 
certain sidewalk in order to get to the library. I walked along a certain sidewalk intentionally—as 
an accepted way to accomplish my plan—but I did not intend to walk along that specifi c side-
walk because that was not part of my plan, which was simply to pick up a book at the library. 
While walking along the sidewalk I also come to discover that the backs of my new shoes are 
painfully opening up little wounds on my heels. While I am knowingly opening up little wounds 
on my heels, I am not intentionally wounding my heels, nor did I intend to wound my heels. 
! is is because it was neither my plan to wound my heels nor was it an accepted part of the 
means to accomplishing my plan that I wound my heels. For more on the distinctions between 
intending, doing intentionally, and doing knowingly, see Alfred Mele and Steve Sverdlik, 
‘Intention, Intentional Action and Moral Responsibility,’  Philosophical Studies 82 (1996), 
pp. 265-287, as well as McKenna,  Conversation and Responsibility (forthcoming). 
 19 For more on the relation between blame and punishment, one may consult McKenna, 
 Conversation and Responsibility (forthcoming). 
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As we have seen, some blame is overt, and overt blame is not equivalent to 
punishment. 
 ! ese two problems for Zaibert cause a third, for even if one refused to 
punish a wrongdoer (whether one communicates this refusal or not), this 
would not entail that one would also refuse to blame her overtly and delibera-
tively. In other words, it is consistent with Zaibert’s analysis of forgiveness that 
one forgives and yet  continues overtly and deliberately to blame a wrongdoer, 
provided that one’s blaming does not involve an intention to cause pain. But 
this is certainly mistaken. 
 To see why, suppose that after my inappropriate dinner joke you “forgive” 
me in both of Zaibert’s senses. ! at is, you refuse to punish me on the grounds 
that you believe that were you to do so, the pain you would thereby cause me 
would, instead of off setting my wrongdoing and making the world a better 
place, make the world a worse place. You also communicate to me that you 
have purely forgiven me. But you were greatly off ended by my joke, and you 
believe that a strong message of disapproval ought to be communicated to me. 
! e message needs to be strong because I am hard-hearted and fail to see why 
you were off ended by my joke. So you give me a disapproving scowl, a stern 
reprimand, and you withhold what were previously normal and frequent invi-
tations to social outings. You even tell me that you have strong feelings of 
moral anger over what I have done. You often bring up my off ense as a topic 
of conversation and demand that I apologize. And yet you deliberately engage 
in each of these activities—many of which may constitute overt blame—all 
the while reassuring me that you have forgiven me for what I have done. Am 
I to take your claim of forgiveness seriously? Surely not: competent speakers of 
the language who had experience with our moral practices would be greatly 
puzzled by such a claim. You have not forgiven me for telling the inappropri-
ate joke if you are still deliberately holding it against me—still demanding that 
I apologize and give account for what I have done. But if you have not for-
given me, then forgiveness cannot be the refusal to punish, for  that you have 
done. Forgiveness is therefore not the deliberate refusal to punish. 
 3.  Collecting Results 
 I have argued that Zaibert’s account of forgiveness rests on three errors. 
First, contrary to his account of blame, not all blame is exclusively private 
for some blame is overt. Second, contrary to his claim that the outward mani-
festation of private blame is punishment, I have argued that there is a diff er-
ence between overt blame and punishment: one can overtly blame without 
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thereby punishing. ! ird, I have argued that the deliberate refusal to punish 
is not suffi  cient for forgiveness, for one can deliberately refuse to punish and 
still continue to blame overtly and deliberately. However, as our example 
makes clear, it is inconsistent with forgiveness that you continue overtly and 
deliberately to blame me in this way. 20 
 20 I am grateful to Eve Garrard and Justin Capes, who off ered helpful comments on a previous 
draft, and to everyone who has ever forgiven me. 
